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FOREWORD
James P. Carey*
Perhaps I have been asked to contribute a foreword to the Law
Journal Symposium Issue on Sentencing because in my ten years
as a public defender in Cook County virtually all my clients ended
up being sentenced for something. One might assume that out of
all of that experience a coherent picture of sentencing goals and
standards might emerge. It does not.
I am not able to make rhyme or reason out of the crazy quilt
pattern of sentences imposed over the years upon my clients or
upon my colleague's clients. Nor do I feel the fault lies solely with
the trial judges. Many of the sentences they imposed seemed ra-
tional. What is worrisome is that they did not all seem rational.
Some seemed to reflect racial bias, while others seemed to manifest
the judge's intention to control his court call.
The lack of uniformity in sentencing as I experienced it in the
courts of Cook County, Illinois may be attributed to two sources.
First, a fundamental ambivalence about the goals of sentencing
pervades the criminal justice system. A tension exists between two
stated ends: the desire stated in the Illinois Constitution, article I,
section II that "[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according
to the seriousness of the offenses and with the objective of restor-
ing the offender to useful citizenship," and the desire to achieve
uniformity and predictability in sentencing in order to enhance the
deterrent effect of sentences.
Second, although Illinois adopted a harsher penalty structure
with the Class X legislation of 1978,1 there has been no advance in
uniformity because of the continuing pervasiveness of plea
bargaining.
Class X legislation is a recent episode in the history of Illinois
legislative attempts to resolve the fundamental philosophical ques-
tions of sentencing: Who should sentence? The judge, legislature,
* Associate Professor of Law and Director, Trial Practice Program, Loyola University of
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1. 1980 Il. Laws 1099.
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or some other person or agency? What is the goal of a criminal
sentence? To punish the offender or to rehabilitate him? Through
Class X legislation we have given ourselves over to harsher penal-
ties, but have not made our sentencing process at the state level
more coherent or effective in terms of deterrence.
An examination of the confusion of sentencing goals entails,
first, a glimpse at the nature of these basic questions, and then a
view of the emergence of Class X legislation itself. I shall analyze
next the way in which this legislation has achieved harsher penal-
ties but has not at the same time provided for sentence uniformity.
Finally, I will argue that plea bargaining is the most significant
impediment to true sentencing uniformity.
The basic philosophical questions of sentencing are interlocking.
They have been answered historically by adoption of either the re-
habilitative model of sentencing or the retributive model. 2 Curi-
ously, the rehabilitative model, the concept that the purpose of a
sentence is to reform the offender, has its roots in the idea of im-
prisonment. Although prison today is perceived rightly as a "school
for scoundrels" at best, in its origins as a penal tool it was seen as a
substitute for the brutalities of corporal punishment.3 Imprison-
ment was designed to afford the inmate the opportunity to reform.
Programs were made available to the inmate to assist him in trans-
forming himself into a law abiding citizen.
With imprisonment viewed as the humane means toward refor-
mation, it became obvious that the crucial decision in the sentenc-
ing process was made at the time of release from incarceration. It
is at this time that the judgment is made whether an inmate has
been rehabilitated. The procedure that placed the critical question
at the time of release, however, also shifted principal sentencing
responsibility to the prison or parole agencies which decided re-
lease dates. As a consequence, the roles of the legislature and the
judge were reduced. The indeterminate sentence, a sentence to a
broad range of years, became the mechanism by which the rehabil-
itative model operated. Under an indeterminate system, the legis-
lature set a broad range of possible penalties, for example, one year
to twenty years. The judge then imposed a sentence within that
range. The sentence was stated by the judge as a minimum term of
years and a maximum term of years, such as six to twenty years.
2. TWENTIT CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN
PUNISHMENT 83-93 (1976).
3. N. MoRus, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 1-9 (1974).
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The inmate's actual release was determined by the parole or prison
agency based upon its assessment of a congeries of factors. Princi-
pal among the factors was the performance of the inmate while in
custody.
In the past ten years, however, support for the rehabilitative
model has ebbed in the face of persistently high crime rates. Ret-
ribution, or simple punishment, has come to be viewed as the most
effective answer to crime. The argument for the retributive model
is based upon the painfully obvious perception that prisons do not
reform, but instead ingrain criminal tendencies. Penologists have
come to believe that no transformation of an inmate is possible
unless voluntarily undertaken. Tying release to rehabilitation
merely robs the attempted transformation of its essential ingredi-
ent: a commitment to change freely given.4
The change to the retributive model has been effected by chang-
ing the nature of the sentence. In place of an indeterminate sen-
tence, sentences to a fixed or determinate period, have been
adopted, enhancing the deterrent effect of sentences by making
their duration certain.
There is room in the retributive model for the notion of rehabili-
tation, but rehabilitation plays no role in the release decision.
Under the retributive view, if the inmate wants to rehabilitate
himself, he is free to attempt the transformation. Programs for re-
form will continue, but participation in them is not a condition of
release. The release date is fixed and the inmate can neither accel-
erate nor defer it. Any attempt at transformation will be voluntary,
unconditional and, therefore, more likely of success.5
In Illinois, the manifestation of the change from the rehabilita-
tive to the retributive model of sentencing occurred through the
adoption on February 1, 1978 of various sentencing provisions re-
ferred to as Class X.6 Class X was a Joshua's trumpet call, demol-
ishing the walls of the rehabilitative model. The legislation pro-
vided for determinate sentencing, created a Class X, or more
serious category of felonies,8 transformed the charge of armed vio-
lence into a vehicle for imposing more severe sentences in virtually
any felony,9 expanded the scope of enhanced penalties by provid-
4. Id. at 17.
5. Id.
6. See supra note 1.
7. ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 38, 1005-8-1 (1981).
8. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, 1005-5-1 (1981).
9. ILL. Riy. STAT. ch. 38, 1 33-A (1981).
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ing for extended terms10 and for natural life for certain crimes,"
and, most symbolically, abolished parole. 2
Class X was an expression of popular frustration with "soft
judges" and "criminals' rights." Yet, although it has dramatically
altered the philosophy of sentencing in Illinois, it has not dimin-
ished the problems faced by individual judges imposing sentences.
A review of recent case law reveals two conclusions. First, the Illi-
nois appellate courts have placed their imprimatur upon Class X
and particularly upon its various provisions for enhanced penalties.
Second, in spite of harsher penalties and more "deterrence," Class
X provides no greater basis for achieving sentencing uniformity
than did its predecessor.
Various penalty enhancers form the nucleus of the Class X legis-
lation. Excluding the death penalty, there are four significant pro-
visions for, or crimes prompting, enhanced penalties: extended
terms, natural life for certain murders, natural life for an habitual
criminal, and armed violence.
An extended term of up to twice the normal maximum number
of years may be imposed when the court finds that the offense
committed "was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous
behavior indicative of wanton cruelty" or when a defendant "is
convicted of any felony after having been previously convicted in
Illinois of the same or greater class felony, within 10 years ... .
The extended term provision has withstood constitutional attacks
for vagueness and for denial of equal protection.14
But Illinois courts have gone beyond merely upholding the ex-
tended term legislation. They have also sanctioned attempts to im-
pose extended terms in an expansive manner. These terms have
been upheld, for example, when imposed upon an accomplice who
has performed no heinous or brutal act herself because, in the
court's view, the nature of the offense was more important than
the degree of the offender's participation. 5 Moreover, extended
terms have been upheld where the offender caused no serious
10. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 1] 1005-8-2, 1005-5-3.2 (1981).
11. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, 19 1005-8-1(a)(1), 33-B (1981).
12. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, 1 1005-8-1(d) (1981).
13. See supra note 10.
14. People v. Devine, 98 Ill. App. 3d 914, 424 N.E.2d 823 (1981); People v. Turner, 93 Ill.
App. 3d 61, 416 N.E.2d 1149 (1981); People v. Hairston, 86 m. App. 3d 295, 408 N.E.2d 382
(1980); People v. Peddicord, 85 Ill. App. 3d 414, 407 N.E.2d 89 (1980); People v. Mays, 80
Ill. App. 3d 340, 399 N.E.2d 718 (1980).
15. People v. Gray, 87 Ill. App. 3d 142, 408 N.E.2d 1150 (1980).
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physical harm, but clearly terrorized and psychologically trauma-
tized the victim.1
Some limitations upon the use of the extended term have been
erected. Double enhancement, for example, is forbidden. Where a
minor charge is enhanced to a felony because of a prior felony con-
viction, the same prior conviction cannot be used as a basis for
imposing an extended term."7 In addition, extended terms may be
imposed only for the offense of the most serious class of crime
charged. 8
Natural life is a possible sentence in two categories: certain
murders,1 9 and in those cases where a defendant is adjudged an
habitual criminal.20 Natural life is a permissible penalty upon con-
viction of murder where the court finds present any of the aggra-
vating factors enumerated in the death penalty statute,"1 such as
multiple murder, murder of a peace officer, murder in the course of
certain felonies, or where the court finds that the murder was ac-
companied by exceptionally brutal or heinous conduct indicative of
wanton cruetly.22 By virtue of a legislative change effective July 1,
1980, the court must impose natural life if the defendant has pre-
viously been convicted of murder under any state or federal law, or
is found guilty of murdering more than one victim.23
Further Illinois legislative change effective two days later, July 3,
1980, made the natural life penalty for the habitual criminal a real
possibility. 4 Where a person "has been twice convicted in any
state or federal court of an offense that contains the same elements
as an offense now classified in Illinois as a Class X felony or mur-
der," and such person is "convicted of a Class X felony or mur-
der," he shall be sentenced to life imprisonment as an habitual
criminal.25 The law prior to this amendment required that all the
offenses occur within Illinois and that they occur after February 1,
1978.2 With these limitations removed and given high recidivism
16. People v. Clark, 102 Ill. App. 3d 414, 429 N.E.2d 1255 (1981).
17. People v. Hobbs, 86 IMI. 2d 242, 427 N.E.2d 558 (1981).
18. People v. Evans, 87 IM. 2d 77, 429 N.E.2d 529 (1980); People v. Walsh, 101 II App.
3d 1146, 428 N.E.2d 937, reh'g denied, 101 MI1. App. 3d 1149, 428 N.E.2d 940 (1981).
19. See supra note 11.
20. Id.
21. ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 38, 1 9-1(b) (1981).
22. See supra note 11.
23. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, 1005-8-1(c) (1981).
24. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 33B (1981).
25. IlL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, 1 33B-l(a) (1981).
26. ILL. RaV. STAT. ch. 38, 1 33B-1(a), (c) (1981) (amended by 1981 IM. Laws 1270).
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rates, the Illinois Habitual Criminal Act2 7 has become a viable pen-
alty enhancer. There is some hedge upon the prosecutorial use of
this device, however, through the requirement of a formal petition
and hearing as to the existence of the prior convictions.2 8 But, if
these criteria are met, natural life is a mandatory sentence under
the Act.29
The armed violence statute in Illinois is a penalty-enhancing
provision similar to the extended term. 0 Simply stated, if a person
commits a felony while armed with a dangerous weapon he com-
mits armed violence. If the dangerous weapon is a gun, a knife
with a blade at least three inches long, or certain other dangerous
weapons, the armed violence offense is a Class X felony punishable
by a determinate period from six years to thirty years.3 "
As in their treatment of extended terms, Illinois courts have ac-
corded wide latitude to use of the armed violence charge. The Illi-
nois Supreme Court has upheld the statute against vagueness at-
tacks. 2 In addition, the court upheld an armed violence conviction
where the evidence showed that the defendant possessed a weapon
while delivering a controlled substance.3 3 The weapon was not used
in any manner to facilitate the offense; it was merely on the defen-
dant's person. Nevertheless, the conviction was affirmed on the
ground that the Illinois statute, unlike that of some other states, is
clearly designed to punish the mere possession of the weapon. Use
of the weapon is not required for an armed violence conviction. 4
There are limitations, however, upon the use of an armed vio-
lence charge as a penalty enhancer. As with extended terms, there
can be no "double enhancement." If the presence of a weapon has
raised the grade of the offense, such as transforming battery into
aggravated battery, the same weapon cannot serve as a basis for an
armed violence charge.35 Further, a judgment of conviction may be
entered only upon the more serious offense, either the armed vio-
lence or the underlying predicate felony. There cannot be multiple
27. See supra note 24.
28. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 1 33B-2 (1981).
29. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 1 33B-1(c) (1981).
30. See supra note 9.
31. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 1 33A-3 (1981).
32. People v. Haron, 85 Ill. 2d 261, 422 N.E.2d 627 (1981).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 265-70, 422 N.E.2d at 628-31.
35. People v. Van Winkle, 88 Ill. 2d 220, 430 N.E.2d 987 (1981); People v. Haron, 85 Ill.
2d 261, 422 N.E.2d 627 (1981).
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judgments.""
These changes have all fostered harsher penalties. In addition,
the changes have once again shifted the focus of sentencing ac-
countability, this time from the parole or prison agency to the leg-
islature, and to a lesser extent to the judge, since he retains discre-
tion to sentence within a given range of years. Although Class X
appears to have made for harsher justice, and for more direct sen-
tencing accountability in the elected representatives of the people,
the problems of sentencing uniformity have not been mitigated. An
examination of cases dealing with sentencing guidelines and with
cases involving sentence disparity is instructive.
There is no better place to start than with People v. Joseph.31
The trial judge in Joseph is one of the most experienced and
respected judges in the criminal division of the Circuit Court of
Cook County, Illinois. He is known for the courage of his rulings
and the creativeness of his sentences. Upon Joseph's conviction for
manslaughter, the judge coupled a sentence of thirty months pro-
bation with a seven-year term of imprisonment. In addition, he
ordered Joseph to serve one day a year while in custody in solitary
confinement on bread and water. The appellate court Vacated the
bread and water mandate, finding that the judge had exceeded his
authority in ordering this unusual punishment.
It is true that in an era where death is an acceptable punish-
ment, solitary confinement on bread and water for one day a year
does not seem overly harsh. Yet the judge's order, because of its
anachronistic ring, aptly symbolizes a continuing problem in crimi-
nal sentencing.
In the area of sentencing factors, People v. La Pointe" provides
an apt focus. Young La Pointe, age seventeen, killed a cab driver
in the course of an armed robbery. The trial court imposed a term
of natural life upon the defendant, emphasizing the "heinous na-
ture of this crime, its brutality, its [sic] a cold, calculating, cold-
blooded act which is indicative of wanton cruelty." 89 The appellate
court reduced the natural life sentence to a term of sixty years,
suggesting that only rarely should natural life be imposed and also
suggesting that the trial court must find that a defendant is be-
36. People v. Donaldson, 91 III. 2d 164, 435 N.E.2d 477 (1982); People ex rel. Carey v.
Scotillo, 84 IM. 2d 170, 417 N.E.2d 1356 (1981).
37. 105 IM. App. 3d 568, 434 N.E.2d 453 (1982).
38. 88 IMI. 2d 482, 431 N.E.2d 344 (1982).
39. Id. at 491, 431 N.E.2d at 348.
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yond all hope of rehabilitation before a life term can be imposed.4°
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and af-
firmed the natural life sentence, carefully listing the factors that
the trial judge had relied upon: "statutory factors in mitigation
and aggravation, the presentence investigation, the credibility and
demeanor of the witnesses, the defendant's premeditation and de-
liberation and the total absence of remorse on his part."'
Although La Pointe argued that his punishment should have
been mitigated because at the time of the murder he was under
extreme mental or emotional disturbance from using LSD, he did
not stand before the court as a sympathetic figure.42 While await-
ing trial, he had walked about the DuPage County Jail wearing a t-
shirt bearing the words "Elmhurst Executioner."
' 4
"
Also, in determining La Pointe's sentence, the trial court consid-
ered the testimony of one Joseph Ray that the defendant had
solicited him to participate in a robbery and to smuggle hashish
into the jail.4 4 The appellate court found the trial court's reliance
upon this evidence of uncharged conduct to be error. Previously,
the appellate courts of the various circuits in Illinois had differed
as to the admissibility of such evidence at a sentencing hearing."
Those which allowed it did so where witnesses had been called and
subjected to cross-examination. Such accusations were thereby
tested for their reliability.""
In La Pointe, the Illinois Supreme Court sought to resolve any
doubt about the propriety of considering such evidence. The court
noted that:
In implementing the concept that punishment should fit the of-
fender and not merely the crime, the Supreme Court has repeat-
edly affirmed the "fundamental sentencing principle" that "a
judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope,
largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may con-
sider, or the source from which it may come" (citing cases).47
40. People v. La Pointe, 85 IM. App. 3d 215, 407 N.E.2d 196 (1980), rev'd, 88 IlM. 2d 482,
431 N.E.2d 344 (1982).
41. People v. La Pointe, 88 Ill. 2d at 493, 431 N.E.2d at 349.
42. Id. at 494, 431 N.E.2d at 349.
43. Id. at 488, 431 N.E.2d at 346.
44. Id. at 494, 431 N.E.2d at 349.
45. See People v. Meeks, 81 MII. 2d 524, 411 N.E.2d 9 (1980) and cases cited therein; and
People v. Crews, 38 IM. 2d 331, 231 N.E.2d 451 (1967).
46. See People v. Poll, 81 Ill. 2d 286, 408 N.E.2d 212 (1980).
47. 88 IlI. 2d at 496, 431 N.E.2d at 350.
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The court found that due process was not offended by such evi-
dence because the principal considerations in allowing the evi-
dence, relevance and reliability, were satisfied.48 Specifically, the
evidence was relevant to the question of whether the defendant
was likely to commit other offenses, and it was reliable in that La
Pointe had the opportunity to face and cross-examine the wit-
nesses against him.4
La Pointe emphasizes that the punishment must fit the offender,
not merely the crime. To implement this goal, the court allows trial
judges free run in the fields of a defendant's history. They may
consider any reliable and relevant information. From such open
and searching inquiry is to come a just sentence in the individual
case. Yet, this reliance on all forms of information-much of which
may benefit the defendant-dramatically affects sentence uniform-
ity throughout the system. Thus, although Class X creates cer-
tainty as to the period of time an individual inmate will serve, the
vexing tension for trial judges between sentence uniqueness and
sentence uniformity remains. La Pointe exemplifies this tension.
The cases dealing with sentencing disparity reveal as well that
the Illinois change to harsher sentences has not accomplished a
corresponding advance toward uniformity in sentencing. In fact,
disparity in sentencing exists in two forms: first, in the disparate
sentences meted out to co-defendants, and second, in the disparate
sentences offered at plea bargaining and imposed after trial.
Disparity in sentences imposed upon co-defendants has not
posed a great problem. The criteria used by one appellate court in
determining such sentences are the degree of participation in the
offense and the nature of the defendant's criminal history.50 In the
most recent supreme court case dealing with disparate sentences,
the court upheld a twenty-four year sentence imposed on the de-
fendant, where his brother and co-defendant had received a sen-
tence of fifteen years.8 1
The acute problem in sentence disparity occurs in cases where a
plea bargain is struck, then later withdrawn, and after trial the de-
fendant receives a more severe sentence than that bargained for. It
thus appears that the defendant has been punished for exercising
his right to trial.
48. Id. at 498, 431 N.E.2d at 351.
49. Id.
50. People v. Godinez, 91 MI. 2d 47, 434 N.E.2d 1121 (1982).
51. Id.
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In general, the appellate courts have sanctioned the imposition
of harsher sentences, masking the trial court's apparent vindictive-
ness with such phrases as "upon trial [the court] was better able to
evaluate those who came before it. . . ."5 This comment appeared
in a case where the trial judge increased the sentence two and one-
half times over the sentence imposed on a guilty plea which had
been withdrawn. In another case, a sentence of 200 to 600 years for
rape and murder was upheld where, according to the defendant, he
had been offered eighteen to fifty years. People v. Dennis," a
pre-Class X case, is rare in that the appellate court overturned a
sentence of forty to eighty years imposed after an offer of two to
six years, solely on the ground of the disparity between the
sentences. The court found that the disparity itself created a pre-
sumption that the defendant had been punished for exercising his
right to trial.
The cases dealing with sentence disparity before and after trial
point out the significant role plea bargaining plays in the lack of
sentence uniformity. It is not my purpose here to decry plea bar-
gaining. The practice has received the imprimatur of the United
States Supreme Court, which observed "[w]hatever might be the
situation in an ideal world, the fact is that the guilty plea and the
often concomitant plea bargain are important components of this
country's criminal justice system. Properly administered they can
benefit all concerned." 5
Rather, I wish to emphasize that the lack of sentence uniformity
is one price we pay for plea bargaining. When a judge imposes a
bargained-for sentence, each side has given something up. Such
surrender is forced by problems in proof or by the pressure to try
other "more significant" cases. The sentence reflects these pres-
sures and not, principally, the defendant's guilt or the potential
deterrent effect of the sentence upon him or upon others.
Class X represents a long stride toward more effective deter-
rence, but it is ultimately a limited step, one based upon harsher
penalties. There is more certainty in sentencing, but the certainty
resides only in the inmate's perception of the length of time he will
serve. Although this has a salutary effect upon him, there is no
52. People v. Davis, 93 M. App. 3d 187, 416 N.E.2d 1179, 1185 (1981).
53. People v. Franklin, 80 M. App. 3d 128, 398 N.E.2d 1071 (1979).
54. 28 I. App. 3d 74, 328 N.E.2d 135 (1975).
55. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977). See also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434
U.S. 357 (1978) (upholding the power of the prosecution to threaten filing a more serious
during plea bargaining).
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necessary overall certainty as to sentences within offense and of-
fender categories. Plea bargaining remains the Achilles' heel of
sentencing uniformity.
The articles assembled in this symposium issue are thus particu-
larly timely for Illinois lawyers and judges because, although not
all are concerned explicitly with Illinois law, they touch upon the
significant sentencing questions, from the problems of sentencing
factors and guidelines through plea bargaining, to the larger issues
of the rehabilitative versus the retributive model. The articles pro-
vide valuable insight into the continuing evaluation of our experi-
ment in harsher penalties and determinate sentences.

